This paper introduces a triadic game structure for conducting trust and reciprocity experiments. A large literature on single-game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the assumption that subjects' utility payoffs are the same as their own monetary payoffs in the experiments. Such designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that otherregarding preferences do not affect behavior. In contrast, the experiments with game triads do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other-regarding preferences. Alternative treatments vary the environment of the experiments from a weak to a strong social context. The observations in two social contexts of decisions motivated by other-regarding preferences, trust, and/or reciprocity are central to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of formulating a theory of utility that can increase the empirical validity of game theory. Data from experiments with the triadic design are used to evaluate recent extensions of theory that incorporate concern for fairness of monetary payoffs and perceptions of others' intentions into agents' utilities.
Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts*
Introduction
In their seminal work on game theory, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944 Morgenstern ( , 1947 thought it necessary to simultaneously develop a theory of utility and a theory of play for strategic games. In contrast, much subsequent development of game theory has focused on analyzing the play of games to the exclusion of utility theory. In the absence of a focus by game theorists on utility theory, it is understandable that experimentalists testing the theory's predictions have typically assumed that agents' utilities are affine transformations of (only) their own monetary payoffs in the games. This interpretation of game theory incorporates the assumptions that agents do not care about others' (relative or absolute) monetary payoffs or about their intentions. There is a large experimental literature based on this special-case interpretation of the theory, which I shall subsequently refer to as the "completely selfish model." The part of the literature concerned with public goods experiments and trust and reciprocity experiments has produced replicable patterns of inconsistency with predictions of the completely selfish model.
For example, the patterns of behavior that have been observed in one-shot trust and reciprocity games are inconsistent with the subgame perfect equilibria of that model. But this does not imply that the observed behavior is inconsistent with game theory, which is a point that has not generally been recognized in the literature.
In one prominent research program, the central empirical question has been posed as a contest between game theory and alternative theories based on ideas of cultural or biological evolution.
1 For example, Kevin McCabe, Stephen Rassenti, and Vernon Smith (1998) Another distinguished research program has focused on inconsistencies between the predictions of principal-agent theory and behavior in experimental labor markets. 2 For example, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, and Georg Kirchsteiger (1997, p. 856) 
conclude that
Our results indicate, however, that the neglect of reciprocity may render principal agent models seriously incomplete. As a consequence it may limit their predictive power.
Moreover, the normative conclusions that follow from models that neglect reciprocity may not be correct.
Widely-disseminated conclusions about robust observations of trust and reciprocity have motivated developments of utility theory intended to improve the empirical validity of game theory. For example, Matthew Rabin (1993) and Martin Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) have developed models that incorporate perceptions of others' intentions into the utilities of game players. In contrast, David Levine (1998) , Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999) , and Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000) have developed models that incorporate other-regarding preferences (or fairness) into game players' utilities. A model that incorporates both intentions and fairness has been developed by Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher (1998) . But there is a problem with the widely-disseminated conclusions about behavior that are motivating these theory developments:
the conclusions are not all supported by the experimental designs that generated the data.
The present paper reexamines some central questions in the literature on trust and reciprocity. It specifically questions the widely-accepted conclusion stated in a recent survey article by Fehr and Gächter (2000b, p. 162 
):
Positive reciprocity has been documented in many trust or gift exchange games (for example, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Berg, Dickhaut, and MCCabe, 1995; .
In the present paper, a triadic game structure is introduced that makes it possible to discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other-regarding preferences. Being able to make the discriminations between the implications of other-regarding preferences and trust or reciprocity is important to obtaining the empirical information that can guide the process of formulating a theory of utility that can increase the empirical validity of game theory. Data from experiments with the triadic design are inconsistent with four recentlypublished extensions of theory.
The present paper varies the social context, in which the triadic game structure is implemented, from a "weak" (or one-task) to a "strong" (or two-task) social context. Use of the strong social context makes it possible to measure the effects of trust, reciprocity, and otherregarding preferences in an environment that is a little less artificial than the usual single-decision laboratory environment. After all, people are accustomed to making decisions in an environment in which there is ongoing social interaction. Some of this interaction involves repeat play, as in interaction between family members and co-workers, but much social interaction in large cities involves play of one shot games in rich social contexts. An example which illustrates this point is provided by automobile driver interaction in Tucson, Arizona. I will provide some stylized facts about that driver interaction after first defining trust and reciprocity.
Definitions and Stylized Facts
Interpretations of data in this paper will be based on the following definitions. Preferences over the absolute and relative amount of another individual's money payoff, in addition to one's own money payoff, will be referred to as "other-regarding preferences." Such preferences can be altruistic or malevolent. They involve ideas of the fairness of outcomes. Let The concepts of trust and positive reciprocity used in this paper are defined as follows. Agent 1 undertakes an action that exhibits "trust" if the chosen action: (a) creates a monetary gain that could be shared with Agent 2; and (b) exposes Agent 1 to the risk of a loss of utility if Agent 2 defects and appropriates too much of the monetary gain. Agent 2 undertakes an action that exhibits "positive reciprocity" if the chosen action: (a) gives Agent 1 a monetary gain; and (b) is undertaken instead of an available alternative action that would produce outcomes preferred by Agent 2 in the absence of the trusting action by Agent 1. Note that the definition of reciprocity incorporates a possible dependence of preferences over outcomes upon the process that generated those outcomes and the perceived intentions of others. This would seem to be a necessary condition for rational agents to undertake actions involving trust and reciprocity. Thus, Agent 1 can rationally undertake a trusting action if he/she believes that this choice may trigger a social norm in Agent 2 that causes him/her not to defect. Alternatively, Agent 1 can rationally undertake a trusting action if he believes that Agent 2 has altruistic other-regarding preferences.
The experiment design for game triads explained in section 5 makes it possible to discriminate between the implications of other-regarding preferences and trust or reciprocity. This discrimination is central to developing alternatives to the completely selfish model of agents' utilities.
The possible dependence of the incidence of trusting and reciprocating actions on the social context of the decision environment can be appreciated from considering the following commonplace example of automobile driving behavior in Tucson, Arizona. Tucson and surrounding areas comprise a medium-size metropolitan area with population of about 850,000.
Because there is only one freeway on the edge of the city, much of the commuter traffic is carried on city streets. The heavy traffic produces frequent interactions between drivers in traffic lanes who own the (both legally-and socially-defined) right-of-way and other drivers wanting to enter the traffic lanes from parking lots and driveways. Each interaction between a pair of drivers, one with and the other without ownership of the lane right-of-way, is (for any practical purpose) a one-shot game in the sense that the probability that this pair of drivers will ever encounter each other again is close to 0. Thus it is not possible to develop a personal reputation with any other individual driver that can provide benefit or cost in the future. But the one-shot games are played in a social context that has some observable implications. My observations of play of this rightof-way game are as follows.
Many drivers refuse to let the other driver in during an individual encounter. In a substantial minority of the encounters, the driver owning the right-of-way delays his/her trip to let the paired driver into the traffic lane. In response, most but not all of the drivers receiving the courtesy wave and smile to convey their gratitude. But because of the social context of play, such an interaction between a pair of drivers is not always the end of the actions triggered by the courtesy of the original driver who gave the right-of way to another. In some cases, one can see the recipient of the original courtesy extend a similar one to a third party. My personal experience as a participant is as follows. If another driver extends me the courtesy of letting me into the street, the probability is essentially 1 that I will extend the same courtesy to the next driver I encounter on that trip.
3 That such "second task" behavior can have implications for the first encounter between two paired drivers can be understood as follows. Suppose that some drivers prefer that other drivers be courteous. Also suppose that some of the drivers with this preference anticipate that courtesy can be contagious. Then these drivers will have a greater motivation to extend the first courtesy themselves than they would if their one-shot interaction with a specific other driver
were not embedded in a social context of numerous one-shot interactions between pairs of drivers. Thus the richness of the social context of play of one-shot games may be a significant determinant of behavior. The experiment design explained in section 5 varies the environment from a weak to a strong social context.
The experiment design explained in section 5 involves game triads that include the "investment" game introduced by Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and later used by several other authors.
The Investment Game
The Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (hereafter BDMc) experiment design for the investment game is as follows. Subjects are divided into two groups, the Room A group and the Room B group. Each individual subject in each group is given ten $1 bills. Each subject in Room B is instructed to keep his or her $10. The subjects in Room A are informed that each of them, individually, can transfer to an anonymous paired person in Room B any number of their own ten $1 bills, from 0 to all 10, and keep the remainder. Any amount transferred by a Room A subject is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter before being delivered to a Room B subject. Then each Room B subject is given the opportunity to return part, all, or none of the tripled amount of the transfer he or she received from the anonymous paired person in Room A.
If one assumes there are no other-regarding preferences, then standard game theory predicts that: (i) Room B subjects will keep all of any tripled amounts transferred by Room A subjects because Room B subjects prefer more money to less; and (ii) knowing this, Room A subjects will not transfer any positive amount. This "completely-selfish" subgame perfect equilibrium is Pareto-inferior to some alternative feasible allocations because it leaves each pair of subjects with $20 when it could have ended up with as much as $40.
Results from investment-game experiments reported by BDMc were that the average amount transferred by Room A subjects was $5.16 and the average amount returned by Room B subjects was $4.66. When data from this experiment were provided to subjects in a subsequent experiment (the "social history" treatment), the average amount transferred by Room A subjects was $5.36 and the average amount returned was $6.46. There was large variability across subjects in the amounts transferred and returned. The experiments reported by BDMc used a "double blind" protocol in which subjects' responses were anonymous to other subjects and the
experimenters.
Note what is measured by these experiments. A Room A subject may be willing to transfer money to an unknown Room B person if he or she trusts that some of the tripled amount transferred will be returned. Further, a Room B subject may be willing to return part of the tripled amount transferred if he or she practices positive reciprocity. But a Room A subject may be willing to make a transfer to a paired subject in Room B even if there is no opportunity for the latter to return anything. The BDMc design does not provide data that allows one to distinguish between the level of transfers resulting from trust and that resulting from other-regarding preferences. Similarly, their design does not provide data that distinguish between transfers resulting from reciprocity and other-regarding preferences because a Room B subject may be willing to transfer money to a paired subject in Room A even if that paired subject did not send the money. The experiment design used in the present paper makes it possible to discriminate among transfers motivated by trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences.
The Triadic Game Structure
In order to be able to discriminate empirically among actions motivated by trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences in the investment game, one needs to run experiments with a triad of games. I shall explain the structure of these games and model the players' (utility) payoffs in a general way. Each player's utility function will explicitly incorporate the monetary income of the paired player. It is important to understand that I am not assuming that the game players necessarily do have other-regarding preferences; instead, I am allowing for that possibility. The subjects' behavior in experiments with the three related games will inform us as to whether they do or do not have other-regarding preferences. The second mover's utility function will explicitly incorporate a variable that introduces the possibility that a trusting action by the paired first mover could trigger an internalized social norm that affects the second mover's utility of the money payoffs from the game. It is also important to understand that I am not assuming that the game players necessarily are affected by social norms for reciprocity but am, rather, including that as a possibility. Once again, it is the subjects' behavior in the experiments that will inform us on this question. 
Game A

Game B
Game B is a dictator game with the same strategy set for the first mover as in the investment game and a specific singleton strategy set for the second mover. Mover 1 chooses 
Game C(n)
Game C(n) is another dictator game with a specific singleton strategy set for the first mover and the same strategy set for the second mover that he has in the subgame selected in . The (utility) payoff to Mover 2 in Game C(n) will not be dependent on the possible operation of a social norm for reciprocity because Mover 1 has no decision to make in this game.
Payoffs Dependent on Social Norms
The utility to Mover 2 of the monetary payoffs from a game can be made conditional upon the possible operation of a social norm for reciprocity. Thus, the payoff to Mover 2 from the choices of (6) ) (
In contrast, in Game C(n) Mover 2 knows that Mover 1 has no decision to make. Since there is no opportunity for trusting actions by Mover 1 in Game C(n), there is no reason for a social norm for reciprocating to be triggered. Thus the payoff to Mover 2 from the choice of c r in Game C(n) will be written as (7) ) 10 , 3 10 (
In the special case where a social norm for reciprocity does not affect utility of monetary payoffs, 
Testing for the Presence of Trust
In order validly to conclude that a first mover has demonstrated trust, the researcher must have knowledge that she has borne a risk of loss from her choice in Game A. Thus it must be known that there exists 
The null hypothesis is that standard game theory makes empirically-correct predictions. In the present context, this means that Mover 1 has not exhibited trust: 
Testing for the Presence of Reciprocity
In order validly to conclude that a second mover has demonstrated positive reciprocity, the researcher must have knowledge that the second mover has incurred a cost to repay a social debt to the first mover. This can be manifested by the second mover choosing to return an amount of money in Game A that: (a) gives the first mover a gain; and (b) in the absence of a social norm for reciprocity, is known to be dispreferred to an available alternative by the second mover. Thus, the second mover has exhibited positive reciprocity in u is strictly quasi-concave (and recalling that the variables are discrete), the choices by Mover 2 allow the researcher to conclude that (15) 
Experiment Design and Procedures
The experiments are designed with triadic games in order to discriminate between the observable implications of other-regarding preferences and trust or reciprocity. Two experiments are reported that have different social contexts. The experiment with a "strong social context" involves a second decision task that follows the first decision task in a treatment involving Game A, B, or C. The presence of the second task does not introduce a repeated game because subject anonymity and random matching make it impossible for any subject to acquire a reputation. The experiment with a "weak social context" does not involve a second task.
Strong Social Context
This experiment includes treatments with Games A, B, and C explained in section 4. The instructions for each treatment announce the existence of a second task but do not explain that it is a group decision task involving the investment game. 4 The experiment sessions are run manually (i.e., not with computers). At the end of a session, a coin is flipped in the presence of the subjects to determine whether task 1 or task 2 has monetary payoff. The payoff procedure is double blind: (a) subject responses are identified only by letters that are private information of the subjects; and (b) monetary payoffs are collected in private from sealed envelopes contained in lettered mailboxes. A detailed explanation of the experiment procedures is contained in appendix
2. An additional appendix, available on request to the author, contains the instructions given to the subjects, the forms used during the experiment, and the questionnaires.
The experiment involves three treatments. Treatment A SC implements Game A, the investment game of BDMc. Each individual in the second-mover group is given 10 one-dollar certificates as a show-up fee. Each individual in the first-mover group is given 10 one-dollar certificates as a show-up fee and given the task of deciding whether he/she wants to transfer to a paired individual in the other group none, some, or all of his/her show-up fee. Any amounts transferred are tripled by the experimenters. Then each individual in the second-mover group is given the task of deciding whether she/he wants to return some, all, or none of the tripled number of certificates received to the paired individual in the other group.
Treatment B SC implements Game B, which involves a decision task that differs from Treatment A SC only in that the individuals in the "second-mover" group do not have a decision to make; thus they do not have an opportunity to return any tokens that they receive. The across-subjects measure of transfers due to trust is then the difference between Treatments A SC and B SC in the numbers of tokens transferred by first-mover subjects to "second-mover" subjects.
Treatment C SC implements Game C(n), which involves a decision task that differs from Treatment A SC as follows. First, individuals in the "first-mover" group do not have a decision to make. Each individual in the second-mover group is given 10 one-dollar certificates as a showup fee. Individuals in the "first-mover" group are given show-up fees in amounts equal to the amounts kept (i.e. not transferred) by the first-mover subjects in Treatment A SC . The secondmover subjects in Treatment C SC are given "additional certificates" in amounts equal to the amounts received by the second-mover subjects in Treatment A SC from transfers by the firstmover subjects in the latter treatment. The subjects are informed with a table of the exact inverse relation between the number of additional certificates received by a second-mover subject and the show-up fee of the paired "first-mover" subject. The across-subjects measure of transfers due to reciprocity is then the difference between the number of tokens returned in Treatments A SC and C SC .
The double blind payoffs are implemented by having each subject draw a sealed envelope containing a lettered key from a box containing many envelopes. If the coin flip selects task 1 for monetary payoff, the individuals use their task 1 keys to open lettered mailboxes that contain their monetary payoffs (from task 1 decisions) in sealed envelopes. There is no interaction between experimenters and subjects during decision-making parts of an experiment session. All distribution and collection of boxes containing envelopes for certificates kept and transferred is done by an assistant that is randomly selected from the subject pool. The assistant also flips the coin and observes all actions of the experimenters in calculating subjects' monetary payoffs.
All of the above design features are common information given to the subjects except for one item. The subjects in Treatment C SC are not informed that the amounts of the "first-mover"
show-up fees and the second-mover additional certificates are determined by subject decisions in Treatment A SC .
All of the experimental sessions end with each subject being paid an additional $5 for filling out a questionnaire. First-mover subjects and second-mover subjects have distinct questionnaires. The questions asked have three functions: (a) to provide additional data; (b) to provide a check for possible subject confusion about the decision tasks; and (c) to provide checks for possible recording errors by the experimenters and counting errors by the subjects. Subjects did not write their names on the questionnaires. The additional data provided by the questionnaires include the subjects' reports of their payoff key letters. Subjects are asked to explain the reasons for their decisions. Data error checks provided by the questionnaires come from asking the subjects to report the numbers of tokens transferred, received, and returned.
These reports, together with two distinct records kept by the experimenters, provide accuracy checks on data recording.
Weak Social Context
This experiment includes Treatments B WC and C WC , the implementation of Games B and C in a weak social context. The weak social context is one in which there is no second task.
Except for elimination of the second task, Treatments B WC and C WC are the same, respectively, as Treatments B SC and C SC . The former treatments provide control data for analysis of the investment game data reported by BDMc (1995).
Comparison with the BDMc Data
One question of interest is whether the first-and second-mover transfers reported by
BDMc are robust to the procedures used in the experiments reported here. Data from Treatment A SC will be compared with data from the no-history (NH) and social-history (SH) treatments reported by BDMc.
Treatment A SC vs. No-History BDMc Data
Treatment NH included 32 subjects run in three experimental sessions. Treatment A SC included 30 subjects run in two sessions. Both data sets exhibit large variability across subjects.
The amount sent varies from 0 to 10 and the amount returned varies from 0 to 20 in the data for both experiments. There are some differences between the two data sets. As reported in the first and second columns of Since amounts returned are dependent on amounts sent, the next tests are on differences between amounts returned and amounts sent. The 1.67 mean difference between the Treatment A SC and Treatment NH return minus sent amounts is not significant (p = .134). Also, the Smirnov test does not find a significant difference between the cumulative distributions of return minus sent amounts in the two treatments (p > .220).
The first and second rows of 
where R t is the amount returned by the second mover in subject pair t and S t is the amount sent by the first mover in pair t. The bounds for the tobit estimation are the bounds imposed by the experiment design:
One would expect that the cone created by these bounds might produce heteroskedastic errors. In order to allow for the possibility of heteroskedastic errors, the tobit estimation procedure incorporates estimation of the θ parameter in the following model of multiplicative heteroskedasticity:
The .055 estimate of the intercept for the Treatment A SC data is not significantly different from 0 (p = .966). The 1.17 slope coefficient is significantly different from 0 (p = .000). Because its standard error is .275, the slope coefficient for the Treatment A SC data is also significantly different from 2 at a 1% significance level. Thus, the subjects' return behavior is significantly different from the prediction of completely-selfish subgame perfect equilibrium ( 0 = β ) and the equal-split fairness focal point ( 2
= β
). Sending subjects did, on average, earn a profit on the amounts they sent, but βˆ is not significantly different from 1, which is the prediction of the zeroloss fairness focal point. The .152 estimate of the parameter, θ of the heteroskedasticity model is significant (p = .004). The right-most column of Table 1 reports the results from a likelihood ratio test for significance of the fitted model. It is highly significant (p < .005) for the Treatment A SC data.
The .667 estimate of the intercept for Treatment NH data is not significantly different from 0 (p = .692). The .687 slope coefficient for Treatment NH data is significantly different from 0 (p = .082). Because its standard error is .394, the slope coefficient is also significantly different from 2 at a 1% significance level. Thus, the subjects' return behavior is significantly different from the prediction of completely-selfish subgame perfect equilibrium ( 0 = β ) and the equal-split fairness focal point ( 2 = β ). Sending subjects did, on average, make a loss on the amounts they sent, but βˆ is not significantly different from 1. The .140 estimate of the parameter of the heteroskedasticity model is not significant (p = .175). The result of the likelihood ratio test is insignificance (p > .100).
The next to last row of Table 1 This estimation uses the bounds and heteroskedasticticity model given by equations (23) and (24).
The estimate of γ is not significantly different from 0 (p = .179), which provides additional support for the conclusion that the differences between the data from Treatment NH and Treatment A SC are not statistically significant.
Treatment A SC vs. Social-History BDMc Data
Treatment SH included 28 pairs of subjects run in three experimental sessions.
Treatment SH data looks even more similar to Treatment A SC data than does Treatment NH data, as might be expected because the former two treatments both involve stronger social contexts than does Treatment NH. No significant differences between the Treatment A SC and Treatment SH data are detected by the various tests reported in Table 1 .
Conclusions Supported by Data from All Three Treatments
Treatment A SC data, Treatment NH data, and Treatment SH data all support these three conclusions: (a) the data are inconsistent with the completely-selfish subgame perfect equilibrium of zero transfers; (b) the data are inconsistent with the equal-split fairness focal point; and (c) the data are not significantly different from the zero-loss fairness focal point.
Trust and Other-Regarding Preferences
Data from Treatments A SC and B SC can be used to discriminate between measurements in a strong social context of amounts sent by first movers due to trust and amounts sent because of other-regarding preferences. The tests reported in Table 2 use data for all except four of the subjects in sessions with Treatment B SC . Tests with other subject samples, and the reasons for deleting data for four subjects in the tests reported in Table 2 , are presented in appendix 1.
The first row of evidence in these data that the first-mover subjects sent part of their show-up fees to the paired second-mover subjects because of a trust that the second movers would not defect.
The second row of Table 2 reports estimates of amounts sent due to trust and other-regarding preferences in a weak social context. These estimates are based on the investment game data from the BDMc no-social history (NH) treatment and my dictator experiment with no second task (Treatment B WC ). The Treatment NH mean amount sent is $5.16 and the Treatment B WC mean amount sent is $3.63. The one-tailed t-test for difference in means is significant (p = .042). The Smirnov test indicates a significant difference at the 10% level of confidence but not at 5%.
Thus, these data contain evidence that the first-mover subjects sent some of their show-up fees to the paired second-mover subjects partly because of other-regarding preferences and partly because of trust. Using the mean amounts sent in the investment and dictator games, one concludes that 70% of the total amount sent by first movers to second movers in the investment game in the weak social context is motivated by other-regarding preferences and only 30% of the total is motivated by trust.
Reciprocity and Other-Regarding Preferences
Data from implementations of Games A and C can be used to discriminate between amounts returned by second movers due to other-regarding preferences and amounts returned because of positive reciprocity.
The first row of Table 3 reports the mean differences for all subjects between amounts returned and amounts "sent" in Treatments A SC and C SC . On average, the amount returned in The sixth through tenth columns of the first row of Table 3 report tobit estimates using data for all subjects of the parameters of the following relation between amounts sent and amounts returned in Treatments A SC and C SC : 
This estimation uses the bounds and heteroskedasticity model given by equations (23) and (24).
Note that βˆ is the estimate of the effect of reciprocity on amount returned by second movers to first movers. We observe that βˆ is positive and significantly greater than 0 (p = .002). Thus the data provide support for behavior involving positive reciprocity in a strong social context. Using the mean amounts returned in the investment and dictator games, one concludes that 67% of the total amount returned by second movers to first movers in the investment game in the strong social context is motivated by other-regarding preferences and 33% is motivated by positive reciprocity.
The second row of Table 3 reports estimates of amounts returned due to reciprocity and other-regarding preferences in a weak social context. These estimates are based on the investment game data from the BDMc no-social history (NH) treatment and my Treatment C WC .
On average, the amount returned in Treatment NH was less than the amount sent by $0.50. Thus the second movers did not share the profit provided by the first movers' transfers. The average amount returned in Treatment C WC was $0.83 less than the amount "sent." The difference between the Treatment NH and Treatment C WC outcomes is in the direction implied by positive reciprocity. A two sample t-test for difference in means implies that the difference between the return minus sent means for Treatments NH and C WC is not significantly greater than 0 (p = .397).
Furthermore, the Smirnov test does not find a significant difference between the cumulative distributions of return minus sent amounts in Treatments NH and C WC (p >.96).
The second row of Table 3 also reports tobit estimates of the parameters of the model given by statements (23), (24), (27), and (29) D t = 1 for Treatment NH data = 0 for Treatment C WC data.
The estimate of β is not significantly greater than 0 (p = .566). Hence the data do not provide support for behavior involving positive reciprocity in a weak social context. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) noted that first movers who send all $10, and perhaps also those who send $5, might elicit larger returns by second movers. This possibility was examined by introducing dummy variables for $5 and $10 amounts sent into the above tobit models. Neither of the estimated coefficients for the $5 and $10 dummy variables is significantly different from zero for either strong or weak social context data. The reason for the inconsistency between the Bolton and Ockenfels model and data from the triadic experiments is similar to that for a nonlinear generalization of the Fehr and Schmidt model. The reason is that the model implies that an agent will never give a positive amount of money to another whose resulting payoff will be higher than his own regardless of how low is the cost of initiating the transfer. But when the cost of giving a paired subject an increase of $1 is only $0.33, as in Treatment B, a large majority of subjects give positive amounts even though this makes the recipients' monetary payoffs higher than the donors' monetary payoffs. Levine (1998) about the belief by player j about the strategy chosen by player i. Rabin (1993 Rabin ( , pp. 1286 gives the expected utility function for player i as 
Implications for New Utility Theories
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Concluding Remarks
This paper reports experiments with game triads that include the investment game.
Several researchers had previously established the replicable result that the majority of first movers send positive amounts and the majority of second movers return positive amounts in investment game experiments. This pattern of results, and results from many other non-market fairness experiments, are inconsistent with the special case of game theory in which players' utilities are increasing functions of only their own monetary payoffs in an experiment. This leaves the profession with the task of constructing a less restrictive theory of utility that can maintain consistency with the empirical evidence. But this task cannot be undertaken successfully unless we can discriminate among the observable implications of alternative possible motivations. The game triad experiments reported here make it possible to discriminate among the observable implications for subjects' choices of trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences in the investment game.
The game triads are implemented in two different contexts referred to as the strong and weak social contexts. Use of the strong social context makes it possible to conduct the experiment in an environment that is a little less artificial than the usual single-decision laboratory environment and a little more like the environment of ongoing social interaction that exists outside the laboratory. In the strong social context, the subjects are informed that there will be a second decision task after completion of the implementation of one of the three games. They are further informed that one or the other task will be randomly selected for monetary payoff.
Because of anonymity and random pairing it is not possible to establish a reputation, hence the existence of the second task does not create a repeated game. The second task does create a richer social context than would otherwise exist in a laboratory experiment. The idea of play of a one-shot game in a social context is illustrated by the naturally-occurring interaction between automobile drivers on big-city streets. The experiment environment without the second task is referred to as the weak social context.
There has been some previous experimentation aimed at investigating the implications of varying the social context of an experiment. In the first investment game experiment, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) implemented both a no-history treatment and a social history treatment in which the subjects were given the data from a preceding no-history treatment. The social history treatment is a stronger social context than the no history treatment. Data from my investment game treatment in the strong social context (Treatment A SC ) appears to be more similar to data from their social history (SH) treatment than to data from their no history (NH) treatment. But the various tests reported in Table 1 do not detect any statistically significant differences between Treatment SH and Treatment A SC data nor between Treatment NH and Treatment A SC data.
The present experiments reveal some effects from varying the social context: the amounts sent and returned are higher in all three treatments in the strong social context than they are in the weak social context. But the change from strong to weak social context has only small effects on the measured incidence of trusting and reciprocating behavior in the game triad. The experiment in the strong social context does not provide any evidence of trusting behavior. The strong context does provide some evidence of reciprocity but, nevertheless, 67% of the amount returned by second movers to first movers can be attributed to other-regarding preferences. In contrast, the experiment in the weak social context does not provide any evidence of positive reciprocity.
The weak context does provide some evidence of trust but, nevertheless, 70% of the amount sent by first movers to second movers can be attributed to other-regarding preferences.
Comparison of data from the dictator treatments in the game triads with data from other dictator experiments provides additional insight into the properties of the other-regarding preferences revealed by the subjects' decisions. In the (DB1 and DB2) double blind dictator experiments reported by Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) , the average amount sent to the paired subjects by the dictators was $1. In the B WC dictator treatment reported in this paper, the average amount sent by the dictators was $3.60. The price to the dictator of buying an additional $1 of income for the paired subject was $1 in the Hoffman, et al. experiment and it is $0.33 in Treatment B WC reported here. The implied (arc) price elasticity of demand for increasing the other subject's income is -1.13.
The nonzero price elasticity of demand in dictator games for (the commodity that is) another agent's income illustrates a reason why the new models that incorporate other-regarding preferences are inconsistent with data from the game triad experiments. Three of the new models fail empirically on one level because of the implications of their linear form. But the models fail on a more basic level because they do not allow for the price elasticity of demand for altruism.
Thus, they imply that one agent will never transfer money to another whose resulting monetary payoff will be higher than his own regardless of how low is the (own-income) price per dollar increase in the other's monetary payoff. The data call for a generalization that incorporates nonzero price elasticity of demand for altruism and relaxation of the self-centered feature of the models' other-regarding preferences.
Results from the triadic design for experiments with the investment game demonstrate the importance of conducting experiments with designs that can discriminate among the motivations that are alternatives to that of wanting only to maximize one's own money income. Play in this game is not characterized by robust observations of trust and reciprocity. Play in this game mainly reveals other-regarding preferences. This distinction is central to the implication that data from the investment game have for guiding the development of utility theory to increase the empirical validity of game theory. The implication is that the data demand the inclusion of other-regarding preferences in utilities, not the incorporation of social norms for reciprocity or beliefs about others' intentions. But this conclusion should not be misinterpreted as a claim that social norms and/or the perceived intentions of others are generally unimportant determinants of behavior. Intentions and norms may well be significant determinants of behavior in some experimental environments but the few other studies that have used control treatments for intentions have found results similar to those reported here.
Sally Blount (1995) compared second mover rejections in a standard ultimatum game with second mover rejections in games in which the first move was selected randomly or by an outside party rather than by the subject that would receive the first mover's monetary payoff. She found lower rejection rates in the random treatment than in the standard ultimatum game but no significant difference between the rejection rates in the third party and standard games. Gary
Charness ((1996) used Blount's control treatments in experiments with the gift exchange game.
He found somewhat higher second mover contributions in the outside party and random treatments than in the standard gift exchange game. Bolton, Jordi Brandts, and Ockenfels (1998) experimented with an intentions-control treatment in the context of simple dilemma games. In the control treatment, the row player "chooses" between two identical rows of monetary payoffs.
They found no significant differences between the column players' responses in the control treatment and the positive and negative reciprocity treatments.
The general conclusion from the research reported in the present paper is about experimental methods: we cannot learn what we need to know in order to provide empirical guidance to theory development by designing single-game experiments to test theoretical predictions derived from the assumption that subjects' utilities are completely selfish. We need to use designs that, like the triadic design, can discriminate between various motivations so that we can discover the various contexts in which trust, reciprocity, and/or other-regarding preferences are significant determinants of behavior and the contexts in which models of traditional economic man will suffice to predict behavior.
Appendix 1. Analysis of Data for Alternative Subject Samples
During the first session involving Treatment B SC , the questionnaire responses of three subjects indicated that they did not fully understand the decision task. This caused the experimenters to revise the Treatment B SC subject information form before running subsequent sessions with this treatment.
In the last session with Treatment B SC , there was one repeat subject. An experimenter recognized the subject as a repeat subject shortly after the session began. The double blind experimental protocol was discreetly compromised in order to learn this subject's identification letter (but not her name). This was done by silently counting the number of questionnaires that were sequentially deposited by the subjects in a stack in a collection box. It was determined that this subject's questionnaire was in position n in the stack. The subjects were not aware this was being done and all of their decisions had already been completed at the time the counting was done. This was the last session in this treatment. Table 2 uses data for all subjects except the three possibly-confused subjects and one repeat subject. An argument can be made that data for all subjects should be used. An argument can also be made that data for all of the subjects in the first session with Treatment B SC (using the original subject information form) should be deleted. The first row of Table 2A reports analysis of data for all subjects. The second row reports results from analysis of the data that remains after excluding all subjects from the first session with Treatment B SC and the repeat subject. The conclusions are the same as from the analysis reported in Table 2 . his hand, he was approached by an experimenter and given an opportunity to ask questions and receive answers in a low voice that could not be overheard by other subjects. When there were no more questions, the experimenter left the room and the monitor took over to conduct the firstmover individual decision task with the Group X subjects.
The monitor carried a large box that contained smaller boxes equal in number to the number of subjects. Each subject was given the opportunity to point to any remaining small box to indicate she wanted that one. (The boxes all looked the same to the experimenters.) A subject opened her box to find an envelope labeled "my show-up fee" that contained ten Task One $1 certificates. The box also contained an empty envelope labeled "certificates sent to a paired person in Group Y" and an envelope containing a lettered Task One mailbox key. Finally, the box contained a one-page form that summarized the nature of the first-mover individual decision task. This form and the corresponding forms for other treatments are contained in an appendix available upon request. All envelopes in the box were labeled with the letter on the mailbox key.
Subjects were given 10 minutes to complete this task. When a subject was finished, he put all of the envelopes except the key envelope back in the box and summoned the monitor to collect the box. The monitor then carried the large box full of small boxes into another room for data recording and the preparation of boxes for the Group Y, second-mover subjects. The monitor witnessed all data recording and Group Y box preparations.
While the boxes were being processed, one experimenter escorted the Group X subjects out a side door of the Economic Science Laboratory and down the hall to the breakout rooms of the Decision Behavior Laboratory. Next, another experimenter escorted the Group Y subjects into the Economic Science Laboratory to get ready for their second-mover decisions in the individual decision task.
The Group Y subjects were given boxes by the monitor. Each box contained an envelope with a lettered Task One mailbox key. The box contained two empty envelopes, one labeled "my certificates" and the other labeled "certificates returned to the paired person in Group X." The box contained the tripled number of certificates sent by the paired person in Group X and a form summarizing the decision task. The form is contained in an appendix available upon request. The Group Y subjects had to decide how many of the certificates to put in the envelopes labeled "my certificates" and "certificates returned to the paired person in Group X." The Group Y subjects were given 10 minutes to complete the task. When a subject was finished, she put all envelopes except the key envelope back in the box and summoned the monitor to collect it. The monitor then carried the large box of little boxes to another room and watched the data recording
The second-mover decisions in Task One were conducted simultaneously with the firstmover decisions in Task Two. The first-mover decisions in Task Two were made by three-person committees that were formed by the experimenter by the order in which the subjects entered the laboratory from the hallway. Thus, the first three subjects were assigned to be in the first committee, the next three in the second committee, and so on. Each committee was seated in its own small breakout room. Each member of each committee was given the written subject instructions for Task Two. Then an experimenter read aloud the instructions while all breakout room doors remained open. Subjects were then given the opportunity to indicate whether they had any questions. If there was a question, the experimenter entered the appropriate breakout room and closed the door before the question was asked and answered. When there were no more questions, the experimenter left and the monitor took over. The monitor permitted the members of each committee to point to a small box contained in a large box to indicate which remaining box the committee wanted. A committee's box contained an envelope labeled "our show-up fee" that contained 30 Task Two $1 certificates. The box also contained an envelope labeled "certificates sent to a paired committee in Group Y" and an envelope containing a lettered Task Two mailbox key. Finally, the box contained a one-page summary of the group decision task.
The form is contained in an appendix available upon request. The committees were given 20 minutes to complete their tasks. When a committee was finished, it put all envelopes except the key envelope back in the box and summoned the monitor by opening the door to its breakout room. The monitor carried the large box full of little boxes to the processing room and watched the data recording and preparation of boxes for the Group Y committees. Next, an experimenter escorted the Group X subjects back to the sign-in room. After all of the Group X subjects were in the sign-in room and the door was closed, an experimenter escorted the Group Y subjects out a side door of the Economic Science Laboratory and down the hallway to the breakout rooms of the Decision Behavior Laboratory.
The Group Y subjects then made their Task Two, second-mover decisions. Each Group Y committee was given an envelope labeled "our show-up fee" that contained 30 Task Two $1 certificates. The procedures for reading instructions, answering questions, and the role of the monitor were like those for the first-mover, Group X subjects. Each Group Y committee's box contained the tripled number of certificates sent to it by the paired committee in Group X. The box also contained an envelope with a Task Two key, a summary instruction form, and two empty envelopes. The empty envelopes were labeled "our certificates" and "certificates returned to the paired committee in Group X."
After the Group Y committees finished their Task Two decisions, they were escorted back down the hall to rejoin the Group X subjects in the Economic Science Laboratory. Next, an experimenter flipped a coin in the presence of all of the subjects and the monitor. The monitor announced whether the coin came up heads or tails. If heads (tails) then each Task One (Two) $1 certificate was exchanged for one United States dollar. While the subjects' money payoffs were calculated, they filled out the questionnaires. In addition to the salient money payoff, each subject was paid $5 upon depositing her completed questionnaire in a box. After the questionnaires were completed the Group X subjects went together to obtain sealed envelopes containing their money payoffs from lettered mailboxes. They had been asked to exit the building after obtaining their envelopes and not to open their envelopes until out of the building. After the Group X subjects had left, the Group Y subjects obtained their payoff envelopes from the lettered mailboxes. 40 The procedures for Treatment B SC differed as follows from the Treatment A SC procedures explained above. The Group Y subjects did not make a decision in Task One. The procedures for Treatment C SC differed as follows from those for Treatment A SC . At the beginning of Task One, the Group Y subjects were seated in the Economic Science Laboratory and the Group X subjects were standing at the back. The Group X subjects did not make a decision in Task One.
A.2.2. The Weak Social Context
Treatments B WC and C WC were conducted in the same way, respectively, as Treatments B SC and C SC except there was no Task Two. 
